נושאים בהלכה · Nosim BeHalacha — תולדות (2026-11-09)

Halachah Talk Column Parshas Toldos 5787
Yated Neeman US Edition
The Rights of the Bechor
In this week’s parsha, we learn about the struggle between Yaakov and Eisav over the
bechorah, the rights of the firstborn. This gives us the opportunity to discuss the
Torah’s perspective on this topic. As always, the purpose of these discussions is to
educate and provide background information, and not to provide halachic rulings.
Anyone who has specific shaylos is encouraged to consult a rav or posek.
Two Obligations
According to Torah Law, there are two obligations concerning a firstborn male: 1)
pidyon haben, where the child must be redeemed from a kohein, and 2) that he
receives a double portion when he inherits his father’s property. In this week’s
discussion, we will focus on the latter obligation.
The Source
The source of this mitzvah is a passage in the beginning of parshas Ki Seitzei: “If a
man will have two wives, one beloved and one hated, and they bear him sons, the
beloved one and the hated one, and the firstborn son is the hated one’s; then it shall be
that on the day that he causes his sons to inherit whatever will be his, he cannot give
the right of the firstborn to the son of the beloved one ahead of the son of the hated
one, the firstborn. Rather, he must recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one, to
give him the double portion in all that is found with him; for he is his initial vigor
(“reishis ono”), to him is the right of the firstborn” (Devarim 21:15-17). We will
explain shortly what the Torah means when it says that his firstborn son is reishis ono,
which we have translated as “his initial vigor.”
We should note that, concerning the obligation of pidyon haben, the definition of a
bechor is the firstborn of his mother (Rambam, Hilchos Bikurim 11:1). In theory, a
man can perform the mitzvah of pidyon haben many times. If he has numerous wives,
and each wife’s first birth is a son, the father must redeem each one. On the other
hand, concerning inheriting a double portion of the father’s property, the definition of
a bechor is the firstborn of the father (Mishnah, Bechoros 46a). This is derived from
the pasuk we cited earlier, “he is his initial vigor” (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat
277:8).
Gift vs. Inheritance
The Gemara (Bava Basra 124a) derives from the pasuk “to give (‘laseis’) him the
double portion” (Devarim 21:17), that the extra portion received by the bechor is a
“gift” and not an inheritance (see Rambam, Pirush Hamishnayos, Bechoros 52b).
What is the halachic difference between whether the double portion is an inheritance
or a gift? Some differences include:
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1) An inheritance transfers automatically to the father’s sons upon his death, and they
cannot refuse it. (Afterwards, they can sell it or give it away, but they cannot prevent
the initial transference of ownership.) On the other hand, the double portion can be
refused by the bechor and he is under no obligation to accept it. The Gemara (Bava
Basra 124a and Rashbam ad loc.) presents this as follows:
If the father dies and leaves behind an IOU indicating that he owes money, the sons
divide between them the amount owed and pay back the creditor. However, in
calculating the portions, the bechor must pay back double. For example, if the father
owes $6,000, and there are five sons, the bechor pays back $2,000 and the remaining
four pay $1,000 each. This is based on the following: Every loan recorded in a
document places a lien on the property of the borrower. Since the bechor receives a
double portion of that property, he is responsible for a double amount when repaying
the loan.
However, since the double portion is a gift, the bechor has the right to say, “I will not
accept the double portion (and instead, he receives a single portion like the other
sons), and I will not pay back double.”
(It must be noted that the inheritors responsibility to repay the debts left behind by the
deceased applies only when is equal to or less than the amount inherited, and they do
not have to pay out-of-pocket.
2) There is a yearly mitzvah to count one’s cattle and flock that were born that year
and set aside every tenth animal as maaser beheimah. When the Beis Hamikdash
stood, these animals were brought as korbanos. Nowadays, we no longer designate
maaser beheimah, as having sacrificial animals in one’s possession can be a stumbling
block. If a bechor received an animal as part of his inheritance, that animal was
exempt from maaser beheimah, as that mitzvah does not apply to gifts (Devar
Avraham vol. I, #27.4).
Selling the Bechorah
We learn in this week’s parsha that Eisav sold the bechorah to Yaakov. (We will
explain at the end of the article what this actually meant.) Can this be done nowadays
as well? Can a bechor destined to receive a double portion upon his father’s death,
sell that right during his father’s lifetime to a younger sibling or to a non-relative?
This question is discussed in the writings of the Geonim and Rishonim (Teshuvos
Hageonim, Shaarei Tzedek, vol. IV, Shaar Gimmel, #39; Pirush HaTur al HaTorah,
Bereishis 25:31), and they contend that such a sale is invalid. This is similar to any
potential inheritor attempting to sell or gift his future inheritance to someone else
during his father’s lifetime, which is halachically invalid (see Bava Metzi’a 16a).
Since the property remains in the father’s possession until he passes, it is not the
inheritor’s to sell.
So, the question is then, how could Eisav sell the bechorah to Yaakov? One answer is
that the sale took place before Matan Torah, and the rules were different then (Yad
Ramah, Bava Basra 126b; Shu”t Harivash 823#).
A Unique Explanation
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What is the halacha in the following situation: Binyamin is married to Yehudis, and
they then divorce. Binyamin then marries Ester. Nine months later, Ester gives birth
to a baby boy, and a day later, Yehudis also gives birth to Binyamin’s son. Assuming
that both Yehudis and Ester have not had any previous children, Binyamin must
perform a pidyon haben for both, as they are both firstborns of their respective
mothers. However, which one is the bechor as far as inheritance is concerned? The
question is as follows: Is Yehudis’ son the bechor since he was the first to be
conceived, or is Ester’s child the bechor because he was the first to be born?
It is reported in the name of the Vilna Gaon that this scenario is the exact case of
which the Torah speaks in parshas Ki Seitzei: “If a man will have two wives, one
beloved and one hated.” The beloved wife is the one to whom he is currently married,
while the hated wife is the one whom he divorced. “And they bear him sons, the
beloved one and the hated one,” i.e., the first one to give birth is the current wife.
However, “and the firstborn son is the hated one’s,” as he was the first to be
conceived. The Torah tells us in this case: “He cannot give the right of the firstborn to
the son of the beloved one ahead of the son of the hated one, the firstborn. Rather, he
must recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” This is because: “For he is his
initial vigor” (Sa’aras Eliyahu, page 23).
However, many Acharonim disagree with this and contend that the deciding factor in
determining which is the bechor for inheritance is dependent on which one was born
first (Ha’eimek Davar, Devarim 21:15 [see there for the alternative explanation of the
pasuk]; Shu”t Sho’eil Umeishiv, Telisa’ah, vol. III, #52).
Questionable Bechor
If there is a question whether the son is the bechor, he does not receive the extra
portion (Bava Basra 127a; Rambam, Hilchos Nachalos 2:6; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen
Mishpat 277:11). How can it be uncertain whether he is a bechor? One scenario is
where the father’s firstborn children are a set of twin boys and no one verified which
is the bechor.
The reason why such a bechor does not receive the double portion is because of the
halacha, “hamotzi mei’chaveiro, alav harei’yah,” i.e., “the burden of proof is upon
the one who seeks to exact property from his fellow.” Upon the father’s death, all of
the brothers become the owners of his property. If the doubtful bechor demands the
double portion, he is in effect attempting to take property from his brothers. In order
to do so, he must prove that he is indeed the bechor (Rashbam, Bava Basra 127a, s.v.
ela; Rabbeinu Yonah, Bava Basra 126b).
Interestingly, the Gemara (Bava Basra 127a) discusses a method by which the twin
boys can exact the double portion from the other brothers. Each of the twins on his
own cannot do so, as each is a safeik, of doubtful status, and can be turned away
empty-handed by the other brothers. However, if each of them signs a “shtar
harsha’ah,” they are then empowered to exact the property. What is a “shtar
harsha’ah”? The word “harsha’ah” means “authorization,” and it grants power of
attorney to the one named to collect debts and monetary payments on behalf of the
signatory. When both of them write such a document giving the other permission, the
two of them together are entitled to demand the extra portion. The other brothers must
then comply, as one of them is definitely the bechor.
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It must be noted that this idea of using a shtar harsha’ah applies only in a case where
it was known initially which was the bechor, and only later on they became mixed up.
However, if they were mixed up immediately after birth, and no one had the
opportunity to ever identify the bechor, neither is considered a bechor. This concept is
derived from a pasuk (see Bava Basra 127a and Rashbam ad loc, s.v. hukar).
Who is Believed?
The Gemara (Kiddushin 74a) states that where twin boys are born, three people are
believed to identify the bechor:
1) The midwife. She is believed to identify the baby as a bechor as long as she is still
involved in caring for the babies. This is derived from the pasuk discussing the birth
of the twin boys of Yehudah and Tamar: “The midwife took a crimson thread and tied
it on his hand saying, ‘this one emerged first’” (Bereishis 38:28) [Yerushalmi
Kiddushin 4:2; Torah Sheleimah, Bereishis 38:28, #127]. The Ran (commentary to
Rif, Kiddushin 31a [dapei harif]) explains that this trust was granted to the midwife by
Chazal out of practical need, as otherwise, in most situations it would be impossible
to identify the bechor.
2) The mother. The Gemara explains that the mother is believed to identify the
firstborn for the first seven days of the baby’s life, i.e., until the father takes him in
order to circumcise him. From that point and onwards, the mother is no longer
believed. Why is the mother believed only for the first seven days? The Taz (Even
Ha’ezer 4:20) explains as follows: Similar to the midwife, the fact that the mother is
believed at all is an enactment of Chazal. Since, in most cases, it is the mother who
cares for the babies, she is awarded the capability of identifying the bechor. However,
Chazal extended this right only until the bris, even though she continues to be the
primary care-giver afterwards. Once the father takes the babies in order to perform the
milah, the father now is mandated by Torah Law to identify the bechor. (We will
explain this shortly.) Since from the eighth day and onwards, the Torah gives that
right to the father, Chazal saw no need to extend their enactment empowering the
mother to identify the bechor.
3) The father. This is based on the pasuk, “Rather, he must recognize (“yakir”) the
firstborn” (Devarim 21:17). Although the literal translation of the word “yakir” is
“recognize,” Chazal understood it to mean that the father is empowered to “cause
others to recognize” that this child is the bechor.
In order to understand the next part of the discussion, a brief introduction is required.
Chazakah
There is a concept called “chazakah” which is used broadly throughout halachic
literature. One aspect of this concept is “legal presumption” based on certain
circumstances. Here are several examples:
1) Ownership. The fact that a person possesses an item grants him a legal presumption
or ownership (chezkas mamon), even if he cannot provide documentation or other
proof. This chazakah gives him the right to demand it back in beis din from a thief,
provided he can produce witnesses that the accused indeed stole it. This is true even
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though he does not prove that he owned it, other than the fact that it was in his
possession.
2) Kohanim. During the time of the Beis Hamikdash, if a kohein wanted to perform
the Avodah, he needed to prove his lineage. Kohanim nowadays no longer have proof
that they are kohanim. Rather, they have a chezkas kehunah, a legal presumption of
being kohanim. This grants them the rights that kohanim enjoy today.
3) Tumah. The halacha is that it is forbidden to destroy challah (the separated piece
of dough designated for the kohein) that is tehorah. Nevertheless, there is an opinion
in the Gemara (Kiddushin 80a) that maintains that if one finds a young child sitting
next to a bowl containing bread dough, and the child has dough in his hand, the
separated challah from that dough must be burned. This is because the child has
chezkas tumah, a legal presumption of being tamei (due to the fact that children, while
playing, often come across dead animals which convey tumah). And, since the child
has dough in his hand, it can be assumed that he touched the dough in the bowl,
causing it to become tamei. Thus, challah separated from it will be tamei. Even
though we do not know conclusively that the child is tamei, the chazakah creates the
legal presumption that he is.
The concept of chazakah is taken very seriously, and unless there is legal proof to the
contrary, e.g., testimony of two witnesses, it cannot be dismissed. Let us now return to
our discussion concerning bechor.
The father’s right to identify his firstborn is so powerful that it can even override a
chazakah. For example: If we see that he has two sons, even though we presume that
the older of the two is the bechor, if the father claims that he is not the bechor, he is
believed. Similarly, if the father presents a previously-unknown person, and claims
that this is his bechor, he is believed (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 277:12).
A Bechor, but not a Bechor
If, Rachmana litzlan, a woman gives birth to twin boys after her husband’s death,
even though the older twin is his father’s firstborn, he does not receive the double
portion. This is based on the pasuk, “Rather, he must recognize the firstborn”
(Devarim 21:17). Since the father himself was unable to “recognize” the bechor, the
child does not receive the bechor’s portion. However, if the twins were born while the
father was still alive, even though the father never saw them, the bechor still receives
the double portion. This is because, in that case the child was “ra’ui lehakir” – “fitting
to be recognized,” and that is sufficient (Bava Basra 142b; Rashbam ad loc, s.v.
bechor shenolad; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 277:3).
In His Possession
The Mishnah (Bechoros 51b) discusses from which properties and assets of the
father’s estate the bechor is entitled to a double share. The Mishnah states that he
takes from those that are “muchzak,” i.e., those which the father actually “possesses”
at the time of his death. However, from those properties that are “ra’ui,” i.e., his
father’s prospective assets, the bechor is not entitled to take. One example of
prospective assets is where the father’s father is still alive when the father dies. For
example: The three generations are Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov. When Yaakov’s
father dies, his grandfather, Avraham, is still alive. Yaakov inherits a double share
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only of those assets that are actually owned by Yitzchak, but not from the future
inheritance that will be transferred to Yitzchak upon Avraham’s death, as that is
considered to be prospective assets (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 278:3).
Eisav and the Bechorah
The pasuk states: “Yaakov gave Eisav bread and lentil stew, and he ate and drank, got
up and left and Eisav belittled the birthright” (Bereishis 25:34). Concerning the fact
that the Torah tells us that “Eisav belittled the birthright,” Rashi (ad loc.) comments:
“The pasuk testifies to his wickedness, that he belittled the service of the
Omnipresent.”
What is the connection between the “birthright” and the “service of the
Omnipresent?” The Gemara (Zevachim 112b) states that until the Mishkan was built,
it was permissible to offer korbanos on a bamah (a private altar) and it was the
firstborn who were given the mandate to offer up the korban. Once the Mishkan was
built, offering on a bamah was forbidden, and the right to offer korbanos was given to
the kohanim. Thus, the birthright was the right to be able to offer korbanos. Therefore,
belittling the birthright was essentially belittling the Divine service.
Rav Aharon Kotler asked the following question: The Gemara (Bava Basra 16a)
states that on the day when Eisav sold the birthright to Yaakov, he committed five
serious sins, including murder. Why is it then that the Torah chose to mention only
that “Eisav belittled the birthright?” Furthermore, why is it that this proves he was
wicked, more so than the sins listed by the Gemara?
We see from here that just because a person commits sins, even serious ones, that
does not necessarily classify him as a rasha, because it is possible that he transgressed
merely to satisfy some lust thrust upon him by the yetzer hara. However, if one
chooses to belittle the service of Hashem, this indicates that he is indeed wicked
(Koveitz Meishulchan Gavo’ah I, page 21).
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